What’s in Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Referendum? – The Diplomat

On June 5, Kazakhs will vote on a package of reforms intended to transform the country from a super-presidential system to a “presidential system with a robust parliament.”

Six months after Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev known as protesters terrorists and requested assist from the Russian-backed Collective Security Treaty Group to quell mass unrest, citizens will participate in a referendum on constitutional reforms. 

The vote will take place on June 5, just one month after the proposed reforms have been released. The reform package addresses 33 separate articles – about one third of the full constitutional articles – and was developed by a working group that Tokayev established in March. The reforms are said to remodel Kazakhstan from a super-presidential system to a “presidential system with a powerful parliament,” per Tokayev’s state of the union tackle on March 16.

A super-presidential system is one where parliaments and courts are solely nominally impartial, and the president and their administration have practically unlimited control over political decision-making. Kazakhstan’s first step to a super-presidential system was the adoption of a brand new structure in 1995 that was pushed by Nursultan Nazarbayev after dissolving an uncooperative parliament. Nazarbayev further consolidated his personal powers with constitutional amendments in 1998, 2007, and 2011.

Nazarbayev started to loosen the president’s management with constitutional amendments in 2017 that barely redistributed presidential powers to other branches of presidency and opened the path for the election of local representatives, at least on the village stage. Nonetheless, Nazarbayev slyly maintained his personal management over Kazakhstan’s politics by together with provisions that protected him as “elbasy,” or leader of the nation.

Get briefed on the story of the week, and growing tales to watch across the Asia-Pacific.

The proposed constitutional reforms strip the constitution of mentions of elbasy and the First President of the Republic, which some see as a continued sign of the Nazarbayev household’s fall from grace. 

Enjoying this text? Click on right here to subscribe for full access. Simply $5 a month.

Along with sidelining Nazarbayev, a number of proposed provisions would slightly prohibit the power of the president. The president shouldn't be a member of a political party, which member of the working group Sara Idrysheva called “the bravest step of our esteemed president.” In anticipation of this modification, Tokayev stepped down as chairman of the Amanat party – a rebranded version of Nazarbayev’s ruling Nur Otan occasion – on April 26. Moreover, the president can no longer override the acts of akims of oblasts, main cities, or the capital and close members of the family of the president can't hold political posts.

Several proposed measures give parliament extra power vis-a-vis the president. Kazakhstan’s parliament will stay bicameral, but the distribution of energy between the higher and lower homes will shift considerably. The Senate will now not have the ability to make new legal guidelines, and instead will just approve or reject laws passed by the Mazhilis. Moreover, the process for selecting deputies to each houses will change. 

First, the Mazhilis can be diminished to 98 deputies, following the abolition of 9 seats appointed by the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan. Those seats shall be transferred to the Senate, and the Assembly of the Peoples will now only get to appoint 5 deputies. The variety of deputies appointed by the president will likely be diminished from 15 to 10.

Second, Mazhilis deputies might be elected in accordance with a blended system. Seventy percent of Mazhilis deputies will be chosen by proportional elections, and 30 p.c might be immediately elected.

The one proposed adjustments to the judicial system relate to the reestablishment of the Constitutional Court docket. Kazakhstan had a Constitutional Court docket until the adoption of the 1995 structure, which instituted a weaker constitutional council. The president nonetheless maintains a robust affect over the Constitutional Court’s make-up, however, with the flexibility to select the courtroom’s chairman and 4 of the judges; parliament chooses the other three.

Tokayev has emphasized the significance of native governance, marked by the first-ever direct election of village akims and plans to introduce three new oblasts that may carry government bodies closer to the populations they represent. Perhaps probably the most disappointing side of proposed reforms is the lack of great movement on native representation for residents of Kazakhstan’s largest cities. If the referendum passes, Kazakhstanis will get to vote for akims of oblasts, main cities, and the capital – however, the candidates could have been selected by the president. The appropriate to elect local leadership has been probably the most constant demands from Almaty residents, and this try and create choice is in the end cosmetic.

The proposed reforms are vital steps towards real consultant government in Kazakhstan; nevertheless, they don't necessarily constitute ahead movement. Most of the amendments are simply reinstating mechanisms of checks on presidential power that previously existed, somewhat than materially changing the connection between state and society, as Tokayev claims.