What’s in Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Referendum? – The Diplomat

On June 5, Kazakhs will vote on a package deal of reforms intended to transform the nation from a super-presidential system to a “presidential system with a robust parliament.”

Six months after Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called protesters terrorists and requested help from the Russian-backed Collective Safety Treaty Organization to quell mass unrest, citizens will take part in a referendum on constitutional reforms. 

The vote will happen on June 5, only one month after the proposed reforms were released. The reform bundle addresses 33 separate articles – about one third of the total constitutional articles – and was developed by a working group that Tokayev established in March. The reforms are mentioned to remodel Kazakhstan from a super-presidential system to a “presidential system with a powerful parliament,” per Tokayev’s state of the union handle on March 16.

A super-presidential system is one where parliaments and courts are solely nominally independent, and the president and their administration have practically limitless management over political decision-making. Kazakhstan’s first step to a super-presidential system was the adoption of a brand new constitution in 1995 that was pushed by Nursultan Nazarbayev after dissolving an uncooperative parliament. Nazarbayev additional consolidated his personal powers with constitutional amendments in 1998, 2007, and 2011.

Nazarbayev began to loosen the president’s control with constitutional amendments in 2017 that barely redistributed presidential powers to different branches of presidency and opened the path for the election of native representatives, not less than on the village level. However, Nazarbayev slyly maintained his personal control over Kazakhstan’s politics by including provisions that protected him as “elbasy,” or leader of the nation.

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The proposed constitutional reforms strip the structure of mentions of elbasy and the First President of the Republic, which some see as a continued signal of the Nazarbayev household’s fall from grace. 

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In addition to sidelining Nazarbayev, a number of proposed provisions would barely restrict the power of the president. The president should not be a member of a political social gathering, which member of the working group Sara Idrysheva called “the bravest step of our esteemed president.” In anticipation of this amendment, Tokayev stepped down as chairman of the Amanat social gathering – a rebranded version of Nazarbayev’s ruling Nur Otan celebration – on April 26. Additionally, the president can no longer override the acts of akims of oblasts, main cities, or the capital and close family members of the president cannot hold political posts.

Several proposed measures give parliament extra power vis-a-vis the president. Kazakhstan’s parliament will remain bicameral, but the distribution of power between the upper and lower homes will shift somewhat. The Senate will now not have the ability to make new laws, and as an alternative will simply approve or reject legal guidelines passed by the Mazhilis. Moreover, the process for selecting deputies to both houses will change. 

First, the Mazhilis can be reduced to 98 deputies, following the abolition of 9 seats appointed by the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan. These seats might be transferred to the Senate, and the Meeting of the Peoples will now only get to appoint five deputies. The variety of deputies appointed by the president can be lowered from 15 to 10.

Second, Mazhilis deputies shall be elected based on a blended system. Seventy p.c of Mazhilis deputies can be chosen by proportional elections, and 30 p.c shall be directly elected.

The only proposed adjustments to the judicial system relate to the reestablishment of the Constitutional Court. Kazakhstan had a Constitutional Court docket till the adoption of the 1995 structure, which instituted a weaker constitutional council. The president still maintains a robust influence over the Constitutional Court docket’s make-up, however, with the flexibility to pick the court’s chairman and four of the judges; parliament chooses the other three.

Tokayev has emphasized the importance of local governance, marked by the first-ever direct election of village akims and plans to introduce three new oblasts that will deliver government our bodies nearer to the populations they represent. Maybe essentially the most disappointing aspect of proposed reforms is the shortage of serious movement on local representation for residents of Kazakhstan’s largest cities. If the referendum passes, Kazakhstanis will get to vote for akims of oblasts, main cities, and the capital – nonetheless, the candidates will have been selected by the president. The precise to elect local leadership has been one of the most constant demands from Almaty residents, and this try and create choice is ultimately beauty.

The proposed reforms are important steps toward actual consultant authorities in Kazakhstan; nevertheless, they don't necessarily represent forward movement. Lots of the amendments are simply reinstating mechanisms of checks on presidential energy that previously existed, fairly than materially changing the relationship between state and society, as Tokayev claims.